Indeed, Alaskas focus on the instant of statehood as the crucial moment of inquiry could hardly be more clear. The Alaska Court did not givecontrary to the Courts reasoning in the present caseany import to the fact that the application ultimately was approved. Although the Court noted that the application was approved several months after Alaskas admission, the Court considered the pending application as relevant only insofar as it put Congress on notice of the action. This application, the Court observed, was still pending in July 1958, when Congress passed the Alaska Statehood Act, and in January 1959, when Alaska was formally admitted to the Union. Id., at 46. And the invitation to do so hardly could have been more obvious with respect to the Refuge, which had been set apart as a wildlife reservation but had not yet been formally approved by the Secretary of the Interior. In stark contrast to todays decision, the Court in its lengthy discussion in Alaska resisted entirely the temptation to delve into the treatment of the lands in question in the months and years following Alaskas admission to the Union in 1959. That case concerned in part Alaskas assumption of title to submerged lands within the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska (Reserve) and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (Refuge). 1 (1997), is particularly illustrative of the timeframe relevant to our inquiry. Indeed, I am aware of no case applying the equal footing doctrine to determine title to submerged lands in which this Court has looked beyond the moment of statehood for evidence of federal intent. It is therefore improper for the Court to look to events after Idahos admission in order to discern whether Congress had months or years previously intended to divest the entering State of its submerged lands. 215, Congress and the President vested in Idaho the accoutrements of sovereignty, including title to submerged lands. At the very moment that Idaho entered the Union on an equal footing with the original States, Act of July 3, 1890, ch. First and foremost, the Court misconceives the scope of historical events directly relevant to the question whether Congress had, by July 3, 1890, acted to withhold title to submerged lands from the entering State of Idaho. The Court makes three critical mistakes in its application of the equal footing doctrine hereerrors that significantly dilute the doctrine. 49, 55 (1926) see also Montana, supra, at 552 ( must not infer such a conveyance unless the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made very plain, or was rendered in clear and especial words, or unless the claim confirmed in terms embraces the land under the waters of the stream) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, disposals by the United States during the territorial period should not be regarded as intended unless the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made very plain. United States v. That duty may not lightly be disregarded, and, as the Court rightly observes, our inquiry begin with a strong presumption against defeat of a States title. Ante, at 9 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Recognizing this important relationship, this Court announced the principle that the United States held the lands under navigable waters in the Territories in trust for the future States that would be created. Utah Div. he ownership of land under navigable waters, it bears repeating, is an incident of sovereignty. Montana v. Decisions of this Court going back more than 150 years establish this proposition beyond a shadow of a doubt. But the existence of such intent on the part of the Executive Branch is simply not enough to defeat an incoming States title to submerged lands within its borders. The Court makes out a plausible case for the proposition that, on the day Idaho was admitted to the Union, the Executive Branch of the Federal Government had intended to retain in trust for the Coeur d∪lene Indian Tribe the submerged lands under a portion of Lake Coeur d∪lene. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUITĬhief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
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